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ABSTRACT 
Anticipating the number and identity of bidders has significant influence in many 
theoretical results of the auction itself and bidders’ bidding behaviour. This is because when a 
bidder knows in advance which specific bidders are likely competitors, this knowledge gives 
a company a head start when setting the bid price. However, despite these competitive 
implications, most previous studies have focused almost entirely on forecasting the number 
of bidders and only a few authors have dealt with the identity dimension qualitatively. Using 
a case study with immediate real-life applications, this paper develops a method for 
estimating every potential bidder’s probability of participating in a future auction as a 
function of the tender economic size removing the bias caused by the contract size 
opportunities distribution. This way, a bidder or auctioner will be able to estimate the 
likelihood of a specific group of key, previously identified bidders in a future tender.  
 
KEYWORDS: Bidding; Bidder identity; Auction; Tendering; Construction; 
Competitiveness. 
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1. Introduction 
Studies of construction companies in the U.S. (Ahmad and Minkarah, 1988) and the UK 
(Shash, 1993) have shown one of the three most important factors that influence bidding 
decisions to be the likely number of bidders involved. This way, previous experience of the 
bidders’ involvement in a series of past tenders for the same type of work and for the same 
Contracting Authority1 provides qualitative knowledge about which firms regularly take part 
in those contracts, as well as the degree of competitiveness each regular bidder has 
demonstrated historically (Fu, 2004). Consequently, quantifying who and how many bidders 
are likely submit a future tender for a specific contract provides valuable information for a 
contractor when making the decision-to-bid (d2b); this is also a key factor in strategically 
setting a bid price to optimise the likelihood of winning the contract. There is also an 
economic impact at a business level, because being awarded more contracts decreases the 
overhead of the company in the short term, and increases its production and turnover in the 
long run, as well. 
Likewise, there are several contributions that evidence interesting connections between 
the number of bidders N and tender outcomes. For instance, the degree of correlation between 
the average bid and the highest and lowest bids in collective bid tender forecasting models is 
higher on average when N is higher (Ballesteros-Pérez et al., 2012a, 2012b; Skitmore, 
1981a). Similarly, the amplitude of the bid standard deviation was recently demonstrated to 
be also proportional to N (Ballesteros-Pérez et al., 2015a).  
Most of the vast literature on the economic theory auctions also assumes the value of N to 
be known in symmetrical models, and at least the identity of all the bidders known in 
asymmetric models (e.g., Maskin and Riley, 2000). This is especially crucial for the theory of 
1 The terms Contracting Authority, client and owner are taken here to be synonymous. 
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common value auctions, where the value of N is a major determinant of the extent of the 
winner’s curse (e.g., Capen et al., 1971).  
Finally, another approach to this issue (Fu, 2004) tries to foresee the number and 
identities of bidders in practice through personal experience of the past appearance rate of 
bidders, mostly as a function of project features (client, type, size, location, etc). 
Nonetheless, forecasting the number and identity of bidders is challenging, since no 
conclusive solution has yet been found for its accurate prediction, nor exists a suitable 
quantitative model to forecast the identities of a single or a group of specific key competitors 
likely to submit a future tender (Ballesteros-Pérez et al., 2015b). This is the gap of knowledge 
identified and, therefore, the point of departure of this research. Hence, the goal of this paper 
is to propose a useful quantitative model for forecasting, first, the identities of likely 
competing bidders in procurement auctions by means of calculating their respective 
probabilities of participation; and, second, the number of total contributing bidders involved. 
It builds on the previous work of Skitmore (1986), who introduced a simple model that 
assimilated probabilities of the bidders assuming them constant from tender to tender. 
However, the model proposed in this paper will take into consideration the contract economic 
size, removing the bias caused by uneven number of contract opportunities. The use of the 
model is explained and demonstrated by a case study with an actual construction tender 
dataset. 
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section a brief Literature Review is 
provided first, which is followed by a Model Outline in the next section. A Case Study is then 
described in the fourth section, introducing an example tender dataset contained in the 
construction bidding literature, together with the calculations required to implement the 
model. Next, a Results section provides the case study bidders’ probabilities of participating; 
and a validation subsection shows how closely the proposed approach depicts reality. Finally, 
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two Discussion and Conclusions sections comment on these results, highlighting where 
improvements are possible, posing unsolved research questions and presenting options for 
future work. For the sake of clarity, the American term “procurement (or reverse) auction” 
and the European “tender” are used here synonymously. 
 
2. Literature review 
As far back as 1956, Lawrence Friedman proposed several methods for estimating the 
average number of bidders in a future tender observing that, on many occasions, there is little 
information available to a firm about their competitors’ intentions, but that it should still be 
possible to obtain a good estimation of the identity and number of future participating bidders 
if this firm is shrewd enough to combine such scarce information with its managers’ 
experience (Friedman, 1956). This approach was restated by Rubey and Milner (1966) in a 
more broad tendering scenario with a specific emphasis on contract type. 
Afterwards, another step taken by Friedman concerning the number of bidders was to 
suggest the existence of a relationship between the contract size (the complete budget to carry 
out the project) and the number of bidders N (Runeson and Skitmore, 1999). This was 
followed through by Gates (1967) and Wade and Harris (1976) but the results were weak. 
Other researchers had a similar experience, with Sugrue (1977), for example, failing to find a 
noteworthy relationship between the contract size and both the number of bidders and the 
number of suppliers and subcontractors involved. Also of interest at this point, is that Park 
(1966) had suggested ten years earlier the possibility of a non-linear relationship between the 
contract size and the number of bidders, but without any empirical support at the time. 
Later, Skitmore (1981b) performed several tests with some international tender datasets 
from different time periods that helped identify a correlation between market conditions and 
the number of bidders but did not develop a mathematical model. Skitmore (1986) analysed 
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this phenomenon again with different data, confirming that the correlation between the 
market conditions and the number of bidders really existed. This relationship was weak or 
moderate in most cases; however, the correlation was significantly better when contract size 
was considered. More recently, Ballesteros-Pérez et al. (2015b) backed up this statement, 
underlining the importance of including the variable contract size in modelling N instead of 
simply treating N as a purely random variable. 
In this regard, there have been many statistical distributions used so far to model the 
number of bidders N. Friedman (1956) suggested that N might follow a Poisson distribution, 
reasoning that if related individuals independently choose whether or not to bid for a 
particular object, this would be equivalent to the number of bids following a binomial 
distribution - which is known to be well approximated by the Poisson when the average of the 
number of bids is a small fraction of the total possible. 
Several researchers have tried to test Friedman’s conjecture. For example, Keller and 
Bor's (1978) analysis of the bidding configurations of a significant number of analogous 
construction contracts and their outcomes concurred with the Poisson assumption. However, 
others making use of U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Statistical summary data from 1976 to 
1978, indicate that N might follow not only a distribution different to the Poisson, but may 
even be bimodal. 
Friedman later hypothesized that the distribution of the residuals resulting from a 
regression of number of bidders with contract size would follow a Poisson distribution 
(Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al., 1986). Tests by Skitmore (1986) indicated that the normal 
distribution was a better choice no matter contract size is measured on either a natural or 
logarithmic scale. 
 
5 
Since then, many other distributions have been used to model N, such as: normal 
(Ballesteros-Pérez et al., 2014, 2013a), uniform (Ballesteros-Pérez et al., 2013b, 2015c), 
power law (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2014), gamma (Engelbrecht-Wiggans, 1980), Gaussian 
(Costantino et al., 2011), Laplace (Ballesteros-Pérez et al., 2015c) and Weibull (Ballesteros-
Pérez and Skitmore, 2014). A compromise solution has also been to consider the number of 
bidders as a purely stochastic variable in experimental settings (McAfee and McMillan, 
1987) or as a fixed value in game and auction theory (Harstad et al., 1990). The Poisson 
model, however, has continued to endure since the very first and celebrated compilations on 
auctions and bidding models from Stark and Rothkopf (1979) and Engelbrecht-Wiggans 
(1980) to modern and current online auctions (Bajari and Hortacsu, 2003). All in all though, 
the choice of model continues to be inconclusive. 
Concerning the bidder identity dimension, over the years, bidders have been generally 
found to vary with project type (Drew and Skitmore, 2006), size (Al-Arjani, 2002; Benjamin, 
1969; Drew and Skitmore, 2006), client (Bageis and Fortune, 2009), specific location 
(Azman, 2014) and, as already mentioned, with market conditions (Ngai et al., 2002; 
Skitmore, 1981b; Skitmore 1986). Nonetheless, Morin and Clough (1969) pointed out that it 
is usual that the same small bidders – and sometimes large companies – submit proposals for 
diverse types of work, taking into consideration that there are limitations to the number of 
contracts that can be managed by one bidder at any one time (Skitmore, 1988); this accounts 
for circumstances in which several bidders agree to bid or not in very similar tenders. 
In this sense, Wade and Harris (1976) proposed to treat probabilistically the identities of 
bidders and their groups, whereas Shaffer and Micheau (1971) had briefly mentioned  a 
predictive technique named the “multidistribution model” that allowed any contractor to 
foresee, with a high level of confidence, which competitors would participate in a specific 
tender. The particulars of this model seemed to be written down previously in Casey and 
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Shaffer (1964). Unfortunately, even though the authors read through this publication, no 
mention whatsoever was found about a model for forecasting bidders’ identities. 
Taking this into account, the tendering theory literature classifies potential competitors as 
“key” (e.g., Gates, 1967; Oo et al., 2010) and “strangers” (Skitmore, 1986), when trying to 
forecast the identities of several competitors, particularly the identities of those from whom 
little information is available. Oo et al. (2010) particularly, put forward a model to categorise 
“key” competitors considering four factors: project size, market, type of work and number of 
bidders. According to them, key contractors exhibit a higher level of competitiveness than 
other more sporadic competitors, the problem still being how to foresee which of these will 
take part in the next tender. 
It is also necessary to mention the importance of the number and identity of bidders in 
auction and game theory (Klemperer, 2004). The interest in these variables has never been 
developed from a forecasting point of view, but driven by the diverse theoretical results it 
produces in several types of auctions formats and under different types of valuations. In 
auction and game theory, the main concern is the study of how different quantities or 
proportions of bidders with homogeneous or heterogeneous “personalities” (e.g. risk-averse, 
risk-neutral or risk-seeking bidders) will condition the results in the auction, while it is 
considered irrelevant exactly who they are. The underlying assumptions in most of these 
theoretical models, however, have seldom been checked empirically; some exceptions are: 
Athias and Nuñez (2009), Skitmore (2010) and Costantino et al. (2011). They will not be 
considered in this paper due to their wide-ranging different foci and interests; however, the 
interested reader can find an in-depth review of the effect of N over auction outcomes in Dyer 
et al. (1989), Levin and Ozdenoren (2004) and Hu (2011). 
To sum up, as can be directly inferred by omission from the wide range of studies related 
to N, there is to date no quantitative model to specifically forecast the number and identities 
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of a single or a group of specific key competitors likely to enter a future tender. This was the 
knowledge gap highlighted in the Introduction and the main concern of the remainder of this 
paper. This study takes advantage of the previous work by Skitmore (1986) and develops a 
probabilistic framework for estimating and combining the bidders’ probabilities of 
participation as a function of the future contract economic size. 
 
3. Model outline 
As stated in the Literature Review, a model for forecasting the identity of bidders in the 
first instance, and their total number in the second instance, is proposed based on Skitmore 
(1986). This suggests that the probability Prj(i) that a bidder i bids for a tender j (I is a set of 
bidders with i=1, 2, …, n ; J is a set of analysed tenders with j=1, 2, …, Cd) is given by: 
         (1) 
where Ci is the count of the number of tenders in which bidder i has bid, and Cd is the count 
of the total number of tenders contained in an analysed dataset. As can be seen, there is no 
difference between the probabilities of bidding in different tenders j (Prj(i)= Pr(i)), since 
variables Ci and Cd remain constant for the same bidder i within the same dataset J. From 
here on though, we will name this probability as the Participation Ratio of bidder i (Ri) to 
follow the more conventional nomenclature found in recent competitive bidding literature 
(Ballesteros-Pérez et al., 2014, 2015c). 
Although we will challenge this initial assumption later, for the time being, we will 
assume that Pr(i) represents an accurate approximation of Prj(i) as equation (1) hypothesises, 
and that Ri equals Pr(i). If this was true, many interesting and straightforward probabilistic 
results could be inferred whenever there is independency among bidders’ Ri values. For 
( ) ( ) i
d
i
j RC
Cii === PrPr
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example, the probability that a subset of bidders K∊ I (a given set of specific participating 
bidders) submits a bid in a future tender would be: 
           (2) 
The probability that a subset of bidders K∊ I submits a bid while other subset of bidders 
K’∊ I do not (with K ⋂ K’ =∅, because the same bidder i can either participate or not in one 
tender) would be: 
     (3) 
and, if the number of potential bidders (those identified and counted, because they have 
submitted at least one bid) is n, the number of possible combinations of bidders participating 
in a tender Cn would be: 
        (4) 
where  is the combinatorial number of n elements (total number of bidders identified) 
taken in subsets of N elements (participating bidders). For the combinations (scenarios) 
calculated in (4) it is worth noting that their respective probabilities can be easily calculated 
one by one by means of expression (3), that is, it is possible to know in advance how likely it 
is that each combination of participating (K) and not participating (K’) bidders takes place. Of 
these, two of the most interesting scenarios would be, perhaps: the most likely combination of 
bidders, i.e., the highest probable combination of participating bidders: 
      (5) 
and the less likely combination of participating bidders, i.e., the scenario with lowest 
probability of happening: 
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      (6) 
And, finally, it is also possible to determine the probabilities that the total number of 
participating bidders K∊ I, whose sum of elements |K|, equals a given number N, as: 
      (7) 
Q being the set of all possible KQ subsets with size N (with KQ ⋃ KQ c=I and KQ ⋂ KQ c=∅). 
Expression (7) is useful for determining how likely it is that N bidders submit a bid (with 
N=1,2,…n) in a future tender. 
To sum up, if each bidder i’s individual probabilities of submitting a bid for tender j, that 
is Prj(i), were known, forecasting how likely it is that any combination of known and 
potential bidders happens by means of Equation 2 would be straightforward, along with other 
statistical information offered by equations (3)-(7). For the sake of clarity, a numerical 
example is proposed to show the implementation of these equations into real practice. 
Normally, there are many potential bidders, but for the sake of simplicity we will assume a 
situation in which there are just four bidders (i=1,2,3,4) that participated one, two, five and 
ten times respectively (C1=1, C2=2, C3=5 and C4=10) in our database of tenders which 
comprises 10 tenders in total (Cd=10).  
With these data and equation (1), it is possible to calculate the participation ratios from 
these four bidders as follows: 
R1=C1/Cd=1/10=0.1    R2=C2/Cd=2/10=0.2 
R3=C3/Cd=5/10=0.5    R4=C4/Cd=10/10=1.0 
Now, it would be useful to estimate, for example, the probabilities of having a tender in 
which bidders 1, 2 and 4 participated. By means of expression (2) this calculation is very 
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simple, since it is the product of the participation ratios of those bidders who participate 
(subset K). In our case Pr(K=1, 2, 4)=R1·R2·R4=0.1·0.2·1.0=0.02. 
As can be seen, the probability of finding a tender with bidders 1, 2 and 4 submitting a 
bid would be of 2%, but, what about bidder 3? The former probability encompasses the 
situations in which bidder 3 enters a bid and when he does not. If we wanted to estimate the 
probabilities that bidders 1,2 and 4 participated (subset K=1, 2, 4) whereas bidder 3 explicitly 
did “not” participate (subset K’=bidder 3) then, we should resort to equation (3), which is 
Pr(K=1, 2, 4, K’=3)=(R1·R2·R4)·(1-R3)=(0.1·0.2·1.0)·(1-0.5)=0.01. 
Of course, the situation in which bidder 3 participates along with bidders 1, 2 and 4 
amounts to 1% as well, since it is complementary to the situation calculated above. 
However, as can be seen, the number of different combinations of bidders participating 
and not participating might be quite large, even when the number of bidders is low, such as in 
our example where there are just four bidders (n=4). This generally forces a series of 
calculations in which the probabilities associated to each scenario are quite small. In this 
connection, expression (4) is straightforward and allows us to calculate the different number 
of participating bidder combinations when n is set by means of Cn=4=2n=24=16. 
But, out of these 16 scenarios or combinations of bidders, probably the most significant 
might be the most likely and the most unlikely combination of participating versus not 
participating bidders. For this, we have expressions (5) and (6) respectively. Expression (5) 
requires the maximum values between the pair “Ri” and “1-Ri” for each bidder i, whereas 
expression (6) takes advantage of the minimum values of these pairs. Both expressions 
multiply those maxima, or minima, respectively.  
In our example, the maximum values for bidders 1, 2, 3 and 4 are, respectively: 1-0.1=0.9 
(bidder 1 not participates); 1-0.2=0.8 (bidder 2 not participates); 0.5 or 1-0.5 indistinctly 
(bidder 3 has the same probability of participating than not participating), and 1.0 (bidder 4 
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does participate). Therefore, the most likely combination2, according to expression (5) would 
correspond to this probability 0.9·0.8·0.5·1.0=0.36. 
On the other hand, the least likely tender requires the minima of the pairs “Ri” and “1-Ri” 
for each bidder, which in this case are the following: 0.1 (bidder 1 participates); 0.2 (bidder 2 
participates); 0.5 or 1-0.5 indistinctly (bidder 3 has again the same probability of participating 
than not participating), and 0.0 (bidder 4 not participates). And by means of expression (6) 
the least likely scenario corresponds to 0.1·0.2·0.5·0.0=0.0, which actually cannot occur since 
bidder 4 always participates. It must be emphasised nevertheless, that despite that there are 
other combinations with a probability of zero whenever bidder 4 does not participate, the real 
value of equations (5) and (6) is the identification of what is the more likely outcome for each 
single bidder. For example, thanks to equation (5) we can say that the most likely outcome is 
that bidders 1 and 2 will not participate, and vice versa. In other words, the most unlikely 
scenario is that bidders 1 and 2 will submit a bid for the next tender, independent of  the 
global probabilities, due to the presence of one specific bidder with a Ri or 1-Ri value of 0 or 
1, conditioning the overall probability result.  
Finally, expression (7) calculates the probabilities that any total given number of 
participating bidders (no matter who they are exactly) takes place. For example, if we wanted 
to obtain the probabilities of all the combinations (tenders) with N=2 participating bidders, 
this calculation would entail the sum of multiple products in which two bidders participate (Ri 
values) and the other two does not (1-Ri values). The combinations would be in this case: 
Pr (N=2)=(R1·R2·(1-R3)·(1-R4))+ (R1·(1-R2)· R3·(1-R4))+ (R1·(1-R2)·(1-R3)· R4)+ 
+((1-R1)·R2·R3·(1-R4))+ ((1-R1)·R2·(1-R3)·R4)+ ((1-R1)·(1-R2)· R3·R4)=0.49 
2 In this case there are two equally likely scenarios actually, each of which has a probability of occurrence of 
0.36, and their difference relies just in whether bidder 3 participates or not. 
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As can be seen, although the calculation burden would be higher (but not more complex) 
as the number of bidders increases, the equations proposed allows obtaining very useful 
information for real-life bidding. The problem is, however, that these expressions rely on a 
series of individual bidders’ probability of participation values (the Ri values) whose 
accuracy is critical for providing reliable estimations afterwards. Hence, this is why the 
proposed model will focus on improving the estimation of the Prj(i) values (as Figure 2 will 
show later as a function of the contract size), as they allow the identity of future participating 
bidders to be forecasted in multiple facets like the ones enabled by equations (1) to (7). 
A bigger problem, however, concerns the hypothesis regarding the independence 
assumption of the Ri values, which subsequently involves the independence of the Prj(i) 
values. In general, the independence assumption is, of course, unlikely to hold within a tender 
dataset as it is generally believed that the same bidders frequently bid for the same type, size, 
client, location, etc. of tenders. An approach would be to estimate the covariance matrices of 
all combinations of Ri values taken by groups of two, three, … , n. However, it is not likely 
that sufficient data will be available for any database due to the extreme sparseness (generally 
over 90%) of the bidder-bidder matrix (Skitmore, 2013). 
An alternative approach is to estimate the Ri values as a function of the tender j size (in 
this case Ri≠Rij). This can be done because, as it is generally considered that certain bidders 
are associated with certain tender or project characteristics (Fu, 2004), this should go some 
way towards removing the interdependencies amongst bidders. Therefore, this approach is 
the one addressed by the model proposed in this paper as it aims to calculate all the Rij values 
for the n known and identified bidders, i.e. not assume them as constant (Ri=Rij  as expression 
(1) proposed), but varying with the next tender economic size. This improvement will also 
require, of course, changing the Ri values in equations (2), (3), (5)-(7) with the new Rij values 
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as a function of the tender j size. A full explanation of this procedure is provided in the 
following section, using a case study as an example, in order to clarify its implementation. 
We acknowledge, however, that the model neglects other tender attributes, such as the 
nature of the work (type), client and location. This can be addressed by restricting the dataset 
to pooled tenders with similar characteristics to the target tender along the lines of Yeung and 
Skitmore (2012). 
 
4. Case study 
4.1. Tender dataset 
A case study is used to illustrate the calculations of the bidders’ Participation Ratios as a 
function of the tender j economic size (Rij) from Fu’s (2004) real dataset of 47 Hong Kong 
construction contracts awarded by open tender during the period 1991-1996 reproduced in 
Table 1. It is worth noting that, despite this complete dataset encompasses a larger number of 
contracts, only 47 out of the total 265 comprising the same type of works have been used. 
Besides, despite being nearly twenty years old, its positive attributes for this case study are 
that: (a) it is a small size, that allows the complete calculations to be shown within the usual 
space limitations of a journal paper; (b) it has already been published and still fully 
accessible, which removes any doubts of its veracity; (c) it contains the engineer’s cost 
estimates for the 47 tenders. Finally, it should be noted that such tender databases are very 
rare in the literature, much less containing the bidders’ identities and cost estimates, leaving 
few other options available. 
<Table 1> 
Table 1 contains several blocks of information. The first two columns provide the tender 
identification (j) and the number of bidders (N) that took part in each tender j; this can also be 
obtained by summing the number of bidders whose numeric ID is given in the last seventeen 
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columns on the right. The second block (third and fourth columns) provides the average bid 
of all bids submitted by the bidders who participated (whose bids are not presented due to 
lack of space) in natural (Bm) and log (LN Bm) scales. The third block (fifth column) contains 
the cost estimates of the engineer which serve as pre-tender estimates and which are noted as 
Bo. 
It is also noted that, even though it is not strictly necessary, the original bidders’ IDs have 
been recoded giving them a number in decreasing order according to the total number of bids 
each of them eventually submitted. For example, bidder 1 participated in 27 of the 47 tenders, 
while the 39 bidders from 62 to 100, participated only once (once-bidders). This allows a 
clear separation between frequent bidders (who bid at least twice) from once-bidders and the 
more intuitive arrangement of subsequent calculations and tables. 
4.2. Calculations 
The objective is to reach an expression of the Rij values that takes into account the tender j 
economic size because with these, it is possible to calculate useful statistical information 
about a single or a group of bidders’ participation as exemplified by equations (1) to (7). In 
order to do so, we begin by analysing expression (1), whose ratio Ci/Cd has been named 
biased Participation Ratio, Ri.  
The problem or limitation with the biased Participation Ratio is that expression (1) does 
not take this into account the actual bidders’ Ci values being conditioned by the contract size 
(budget) opportunities distribution for which those bidders can submit bids. For example, 
imagine two bidders - A and B. Bidder A prefers to take part in tenders with big budgets with 
RA=0.5 (participates in half of those big contracts), whereas bidder B shows preference for 
smaller contracts with the same RB=0.5. Now, assume that a series of tenders are open for 
bidding, being mostly of these of small economic size. What will be observed is that bidder B 
participates more frequently than bidder A (RB>RA) because CB>CA for the same Cd. If there 
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were a majority of big contracts on the other hand, the perception of the bidders A and B’s 
participation ratios would be exactly the opposite, that is, we would think that RA>RB. This is 
the reason the ratios are called biased, since they strongly depend on the distribution of 
contract size opportunities. There is only one exception: when the number of contract size 
opportunities follows a perfect uniform distribution, that is, when there are the same 
opportunities for every size of contracts for the bidders to submit their bids. However, the 
distribution of contract size opportunities has been widely studied and has long been known 
to resemble a log-normal distribution (Skitmore, 1986), distorting the bidders’ participation 
ratios by augmenting the Ri values of bidders’ that prefer to participate in tenders whose 
economic size is near the average of the log-normal distribution, and diminishing the Ri ratios 
of bidders that prefer to take part in tenders located far from the distribution average. 
The first step is to correct the Ri values, that is to obtain the actual (unbiased) Rij values, 
which requires resorting nonetheless to the biased Ri values, whose calculations are presented 
on the upper block of Table 2. As can be easily seen, this basically retrieves all the bidders’ 
mean bid values (in log scale) and presents them ordered from lower to higher. On the left, 
the same calculations are reproduced for the complete dataset. The counts of all bidders’ bids 
(Ci), the 50 47 tenders (Cd), as well as the biased participation ratios (Ri) are presented on the 
lowest two lines of the upper block of Table 2. 
<Table 2> 
The intermediate lower block in Table 2 is devoted to calculating the mean (μi) and 
standard deviation (σi) of the series of each bidder i’s LN Bm values by which, every bidder i’s 
log-normal distribution can be defined. Also, on the left, the same calculations are performed 
for the whole database (μd and σd values). 
Finally, the lowest block in Table 2 shows a series of Anderson-Darling tests to check 
whether the log-normal distributions initially assumed represent a good fit. The results show 
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that, with just one exception out of the 62 cases (which can be attributed to a type 1 error), 
the log-normal distribution cannot be rejected at the 5% standard level of significance. 
Figure 1 represents the actual cumulative distribution functions (CDF) of the five most 
frequent bidders in the database along with the complete dataset CDF values. The X values in 
Figure 1 correspond to the LN Bm values shown in the upper block of Table 2, whereas the Y 
values (probabilities) have been calculated by the expression (Order-0.5)/Ordermax with 
Ordermax =Ci (for the five bidders) or Cd (for the complete dataset), respectively. 
<Figure 1> 
It has been commented that the distribution of the contract size opportunities (in this case, 
the second column in Table 2 and the thickest curve in Figure 1) usually follows a log-normal 
distribution. However, by looking at all the bidders’ log-normal distributions in Figure 1 and 
Table 1, a reasonable question that arises is whether the log-normal distributions are the 
consequence of either the database log-normal filter or that the bidders’ distributions are 
genuinely log-normal. This question cannot be answered directly, because it is not possible to 
remove the underlying effect of the complete dataset distribution of contract sizes from each 
bidder’s tender participation curve.  
One way to investigate this is by analysing other databases. In this regard, Table 3 shows 
a series of twelve international construction and services tender databases that have been 
divided into two vertical divisions. The upper three are databases in which at least one bidder 
participated in almost all tenders. The last eight databases (ID from 4 to 12, the seventh of 
which is the one used partially in this case study) are all databases gathered from a single 
client or contracting authority in which all the tenders (not only those in which the same 
bidder took part) are retrieved. 
<Table 3> 
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The aim of Table 3 is to determine if, no matter the database is complete or conditioned 
by the participation preference of one bidder, the distribution of every bidder’s contract size 
participation can be well modelled by a log-normal distribution. The series of pass () values 
of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests performed on the twelve databases evidences this to be 
indeed the case. Therefore, the biased values behave as log-normal no matter whether the 
underlying distribution is originally log-normal or not. Hence, the unbiased participation 
ratios Rij, as a function of the tender j size, can be calculated for every bidder i as: 
   (8) 
Unlike the biased Ri ratios, these are free from distortion by the contract size 
opportunities distribution, since the bidder i’s log-normal distribution in absolute values has 
been taken (this is why it is multiplied by Ci in the numerator, that is, the number of tenders 
in which bidder i is willing to participate depending on the contract size) and divided into the 
number of tenders (not only probability density, and that is why it is also multiplied by Cd in 
the denominator) that are available in each tender size range. A similar result could have been 
obtained by dividing the tenders into ranges of different tender sizes and calculating an Ri 
value for each range, but that approach would have left the domain outside the minimum and 
maximum contract size with no information. 
Expression (8) can be simplified by working with log values to 
   (9) 
this being the expression that has been used in the case study. For the unaware reader, the 
ratio of two normal distributions cannot be reduced further (and not always is another log-
normal distribution), unless the distributions in both the numerator and the denominator are 
standard normal distributions, which would result in the Cauchy distribution. 
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5. Results 
5.1. Bidders’ unbiased participation ratios 
If equation (9) is applied to all bidders’ values, since variables μi, σi, Ci, μd, σd, Cd were all 
calculated in Table 2 for all bidders who submitted at least five bids, for the sake of brevity, 
and the complete database respectively, the result would be a ratio of two normal 
distributions that can be transformed into a figure as soon as variable Bm takes on a particular 
value. Therefore, Figure 2 represents the particularisation of expression (9) for the five most 
frequent bidders. 
<Figure 2> 
As can be seen, curves represented in Figure 2 differ greatly from a constant value as 
equation (1) initially proposed, and that is why these ratios are expected to be far more close 
to reality. However, there is one exception to the rule: when a bidder i has submitted just one 
bid, the standard deviation σi of their log-normal distributions cannot be calculated, therefore 
equation (9) for calculating the unbiased participation ratios (Rij) cannot be evaluated due to 
insufficient data. In those cases, the biased participation ratios (Ri,), which are constant 
irrespective of the contract size by means of expression (1), constitute the only valid 
alternative. As noted, this happens when a bidder has only submitted one bid (once-bidder), 
which tends to be a big proportion of bidders within most databases. Hence, in the case study, 
bidders 62 to 100 were once-bidders and in those cases all of them are assumed to have the 
same participation ratio as all of them participated indistinctly once out of the all auctions of 
the dataset, which numerically is equivalent to R62j= …=R100 j= R62=…= R100=1/Cd=1/47= 
=0.0213. 
Finally, another important matter that has to be addressed is how to accurately forecast a 
future tender Bm value so as to be able to work with equation (9). The answer is quite 
straightforward: there is usually a strong linear correlation between the engineer’s or the 
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same bidder’s cost estimates and the tender mean bids (Ballesteros-Pérez et al., 2013a, 
2012a). Regarding this correlation, Figure 3 shows the best regression straight line between 
Bo (X) and Bm (Y) whose coefficient of determination is close to one (R²=0.9343). 
<Figure 3> 
This regression line is generally assumed to have a zero intercept (it crosses the origin of 
coordinates) so just a single pair of (Bo, Bm) values is needed to provide a first estimate of the 
line gradient (which in this case equals 1.114). In cases in which the forecaster does not even 
have single prior cost estimate available, he/she can assume that Bo=Bm, which is expected to 
be better than using expression (1). 
5.2. Method validation 
As can be observed, the method of obtaining the unbiased participation ratios Rij is quite 
simple. These latter values can be directly implemented instead of the current Ri values in 
equations (2) to (7) depending on which statistical results are wanted. 
However, a validation procedure is needed to check the assumptions made in the model. 
Initially, the alert reader might think that Discriminant Analysis could be a logical option, but 
the generally low participation ratio values as well as the high number of scenarios (possible 
combinations of bidders) would make the direct comparison between actual and predicted 
group membership extremely difficult. 
An alternative validation procedure is required and to do this, 10 000 artificial tenders 
were generated by Monte-Carlo simulation. Each simulation j selected randomly a Bmj value 
as the inverse of a log-normal distribution whose average and standard deviation were the 
same as the μd and σd values, respectively, in Table 2. Then, all not once-bidders’ (bidders 
from 1 to 61) Rij values were calculated by means of expression (9), while the Rij values of 
once-bidders (bidders 62 to 100) were considered as constant (R62j= …=R100 j= R62=…= 
R100=1/Cd=1/47 =0.0213). 
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Having calculated all the Rij values, the participation of each bidder was decided as a 
function of this dichotomic option: if a 0-to-1 randomly generated number was below that 
bidder i’s Rij value, then that bidder participates in the tender j, otherwise (random>Rij) the 
bidder is considered not to submit a bid. This approach is equivalent to numerically obtaining 
the probabilities of a Poisson Binomial distribution whose different Bernouilli experiments 
are associated to the Rij probability values. Therefore, for all the 10 000 artificial tenders, the 
number of bidders eventually participating was counted (N values) and their probability 
density and cumulative functions (N model curves shown in Figure 4) were easily obtained. 
The comparison of the actual distribution of N and the curve obtained by means of the 
10,000 simulations is presented in Figure 4. The overlap between both curves is remarkable, 
with the maximum deviation of below 0.057 between the Y’s N actual and model curves 
occurring at X=N=11, being well within the Kolmogorov-Smirnov critical value of 0.194 for 
p<0.05. The results therefore confirm empirically that the method is very precise, despite the 
large amount of once-bidders and despite using a log-normal distribution for modelling the 
contract size opportunities instead of a multiple repetition of the 47 actual Bm values. 
<Figure 4> 
 
6. Discussion 
Despite the method developed above being a simple, yet powerful, approach to 
forecasting individual bidder participation, some issues deserve further comment: 
1. The question arises as to whether the same assumptions hold for datasets in which there is 
a shared bidder (for example tender databases 1 to 3 in Table 3). This was tested by using 
the same method in that kind of databases (not included here due to space limitations), 
with quite similar results. However, it is clear that when the proposed method is 
implemented in a database gathered by the same bidder whose participation is constant in 
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all (or almost all) contracts, the forecasting results will only become useful for that 
specific bidder. This is because the database will quite probably have lost some 
information concerning the participation of other bidders against which the shared bidder 
does not usually compete. 
2. It can be questioned whether the method could also apply to other tenders with a larger 
number of bidders, with more complex characteristics or even with a selective tendering 
scheme, instead of the open tendering approach like the example shown here. Concerning 
the first two variants (tenders with larger N and multi-attribute tenders in which other 
factors besides the economic bid are taken into consideration for awarding the contract), 
the model developed is equally valid, since it relies on two main variables: the average 
bid price of a tender and a series of bidders that either participate or not, and those 
variables are shared with the latter two kinds of tenders as well. Regarding selective 
tenders, unlike open tendering where bidders can freely submit their bids whenever they 
are qualified to do so, only those bidders invited by the contracting authority can take 
part. Perhaps surprisingly, results obtained with selective tendering databases (also not 
presented here due to lack of space) indicate that, unless the contracting authority chooses 
the invited subset of bidders without following coherent criteria (for instance, according 
to the contract size or type of work), the method continues to be applicable. 
3. The question also arises of how to handle the situation when there are N=1 tenders or 
even N=0 tenders. With all the databases examined, neither of these situations occur. 
However, it is quite likely that the datasets themselves were created on this premise (even 
avoiding tenders with N=2 bidders such as in the present dataset) probably to avoid 
problems related to under competitiveness. This may be because, when this happens in 
practice, tenders are usually re-opened and the first encounter generally forgotten and not 
registered. To accommodate this situation, a suitable approach to obtain the corrected N 
 
22 
model curve from Figure 4 would be to just calculate the sum of probabilities Pr(N=0) + 
Pr(N=1) = PN=0,1, and divide the rest of probability values Pr(N=2, 3, …) by “1–PN=0,1” 
while setting Pr(N=0)=0 and Pr(N=1)=0. 
4. Another interesting issue is whether the method could gain in accuracy by using the 
actual bid values for each bidder i instead of the Bm values when calculating, for example, 
the fit of each log-normal distribution. Empirical results from other researchers with other 
databases (Ballesteros-Pérez and Skitmore, 2014) indicate that the differences found in 
the μi and σi values are very small, especially after the transformation into log values. 
Moreover, the fact that a forecasting bidder might need only the Bm values instead of all 
the bidders’ bids makes the method more attractive as the number of calculations is even 
lower. 
5. The treatment of once bidders is a possible cause for concern, with the simplification 
assuming that their Rij values are assumed to be constant and equal to 1/Cd. Once-bidders, 
or even those bidders who might potentially participate in future but are not yet present in 
the database, constitute one of the most recurring problems in the empirical competitive 
bidding literature. The best that can be said here is that this simplification did not affect 
the accuracy shown in Figure 4 because the series of 10 000 Bm values generated in the 
simulation verification procedure responded to the same pattern as the original data, 
lending support to the expectation that once-bidders react analogously according to the 
participation ratio of 1/47. However, how could we check whether these bidders would 
have had a preference for some tender sizes when we only a single point is available from 
each them? One approach to this is to simultaneously arrange the tenders in increasing 
and decreasing order of size and represent the cumulative ratio of appearance of total 
number of once-bidders per tender for both orders. The results of this analysis can be 
found in Figure 5, which, at least with the case study data, shows that treating all once-
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bidders as the same bidder with Rij=Ri=1/Cd constitutes a reasonable approximation. This 
is because both curves evidence very similar gradients most of the time, which means that 
the ratio of appearance of once-bidders per new tender is quite similar no matter whether 
the tenders’ average size is big or small. Repeating this with other databases indicates this 
to be generally the case, but with occasional exceptions in which the ratio of appearance 
of once-bidders for large contracts was higher compared to the smaller contracts. This 
may be due to bidders for larger contacts being less local than those for smaller contracts 
and therefore less prone to figure in local databases, but further research is needed to 
establish this point. 
<Figure 5> 
6. A last note is worth including about the ethical issues that may arise when implementing 
the method described here. It is well known that disclosing the identity of participating 
bidders by the auctioner to a subset of the future participants, or the action of sharing 
inner and privileged information among bidders with the intention of favouring some 
while being detrimental to the rest (namely, collusion) is considered an illegal practice. 
However, the developed method makes use of data that are publicly available or that can 
be complemented with a company’s personal information (for example, the cost estimates 
of the previous contracts). In this sense, the method only requires processing and taking 
advantage of personal and public information, therefore its implementation can be 
considered absolutely valid, legal and advantageous, whenever the information derived is 
not used in agreement with other bidders. 
 
7. Conclusions 
Predicting the number of potential bidders competing in a future tender was a highly 
debated topic for many years in the construction management literature, and equally affects 
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other areas in the context of tendering and procurement. After over 30 years of debate, 
however, researchers from many fields apparently ran out of ideas and enthusiasm and 
satisfactory solutions were never reached. 
That is the point of departure of this work in which a new method for forecasting the 
identity and number of bidders is proposed, which is expected to reignite the debate whose 
real-life applications would be immediate and transcendent in competitive bidding, since 
these variables partially condition the bidders’ decision to bid, and their competitive 
behaviour by means of the final bid price setting, as well as some other important tender 
results, such as the concentration or dispersion of the bid values or the degree of correlation 
between the average and the lowest bids, being these key assumptions of many bid tender 
forecasting models (Ballesteros-Pérez et al., 2015b). 
To achieve this goal, the paper starts with a brief but thorough review of the most 
representative literature on forecasting the number and identity of bidders. A new model is 
then developed by extending Skitmore's (1986) work by assimilating participation ratios into 
the probability of each bidder taking part in a future tender. The participation ratios are 
refined by removing the bias caused by the uneven number of contract size opportunities, and 
expressing them as a function of the contract economic size through the ratio of two simple 
log-normal distributions. This provides a model that does not require complex calculations, is 
quite accurate, and is ready-to-use for real-life applications in which a bidder or contracting 
authority wants to estimate the likelihood of a specific single individual, or group of key 
previously identified bidders, submitting a bid in a future tender. The validation process 
shows that the model is also capable of indirectly calculating the total number of participating 
bidders’ distribution by means of a numerical implementation of a Poisson Binomial 
distribution whose Bernouilli probabilities of success are assimilated to the Participation 
Ratios obtained earlier. 
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The model presented is not complete yet, since there are other tender characteristics (e.g. 
client, type, location) that have been intentionally neglected. Future work will either embed 
these characteristics in the model or using a subset of the database of projects with similar 
characteristics identified by an appropriate method of pooling such as developed by Yeung 
and Skitmore (2012). More work is also needed in analysing the implications and loss of 
accuracy due to the assumption of independence of the participation ratios (probability of 
participation). Although the current model has taken a significant step in that direction, it is 
well known by practitioners that bidders are often affected by who they are, or likely to be, 
bidding against – suggesting a possible application of game theory in future work. 
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Tender Nº bidders Mean bid Log Mean bid Engineer's Cost est. Bidder(i) (identities of bidders from ↓ to ↑ bid)► 
(j) (N) (Bm) (LN Bm) (Bo) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) 
1 16 9,686,030 16.086 7,946,837 10 35 22 19 4 20 17 87 9 61 83 93 7 100 99 92  2 9 28,415,299 17.162 32,717,190 61 90 45 88 91 59 19 44 36         3 10 26,950,453 17.110 22,085,527 97 86 60 59 4 85 44 3 6 45        4 4 22,905,464 16.947 20,452,058 96 94 45 13              5 12 15,132,109 16.532 12,818,817 17 1 16 19 18 30 2 25 77 68 13 21      6 17 20,412,549 16.832 20,166,667 5 1 4 54 6 32 47 9 55 10 13 72 53 52 7 70 41 
7 11 37,397,035 17.437 41,197,688 4 14 17 19 12 1 33 22 16 8 28       8 13 29,557,430 17.202 24,773,359 13 31 16 8 17 12 33 4 28 7 22 41 30     9 8 29,270,416 17.192 28,409,004 17 1 12 30 40 16 37 39          10 9 23,288,908 16.963 21,445,392 41 5 12 36 8 52 4 7 38         11 8 15,837,168 16.578 15,033,081 17 14 43 36 32 7 8 22          12 12 30,634,246 17.238 30,075,610 28 43 2 8 3 39 4 14 56 22 13 7      13 7 73,933,651 18.119 59,041,433 6 1 3 31 46 21 7           14 5 66,871,052 18.018 64,510,534 1 6 31 3 11             15 5 50,643,989 17.740 35,163,834 4 5 1 6 3             16 7 54,947,923 17.822 42,532,702 1 58 3 4 16 5 11           17 6 44,609,273 17.613 41,783,933 3 5 1 4 16 2            18 7 49,620,702 17.720 49,403,385 58 3 4 16 2 1 5           19 6 44,257,298 17.606 38,121,405 29 2 56 3 5 69            20 5 98,482,309 18.405 65,801,501 5 2 12 3 4             21 5 66,803,823 18.017 55,493,122 31 5 3 1 2             22 5 56,972,579 17.858 32,969,570 12 5 35 1 2             23 3 61,792,701 17.939 50,419,645 36 18 24               24 12 54,063,116 17.806 52,179,813 5 10 60 4 7 6 20 1 3 2 23 8      25 13 52,632,198 17.779 34,949,799 14 7 23 10 4 1 43 5 57 8 21 11 18     26 6 81,034,245 18.210 73,785,292 10 6 2 1 4 8            27 9 113,779,940 18.550 83,713,655 10 20 1 2 4 24 8 5 44         28 10 82,222,571 18.225 75,087,435 24 5 23 6 35 1 2 9 4 8        29 9 108,478,803 18.502 78,376,384 23 6 1 2 12 9 32 10 24         30 9 92,950,923 18.348 95,160,427 10 15 1 23 2 9 24 35 6         31 8 32,798,912 17.306 31,426,753 28 3 34 6 1 2 5 4          32 6 89,469,514 18.309 86,982,546 1 6 9 2 15 12            33 7 98,579,660 18.406 89,757,288 34 15 6 1 2 3 9           34 6 103,983,088 18.460 88,809,151 6 1 42 2 9 3            35 9 68,563,040 18.043 53,824,220 30 34 13 18 32 21 33 98 57         36 15 61,345,823 17.932 50,966,816 3 2 1 24 9 6 37 42 3 6 2 9 1 24 37   37 8 79,826,297 18.195 65,706,624 15 37 9 2 3 1 42 74          38 7 58,034,490 17.877 51,677,529 15 9 2 3 37 26 1           39 14 91,374,772 18.330 82,549,634 40 53 50 27 38 14 6 63 49 11 3 25 21 29    40 6 108,676,000 18.504 93,097,653 3 18 29 27 67 26            41 7 155,298,815 18.861 139,121,526 14 2 1 49 29 51 65           42 6 79,827,787 18.195 73,685,775 75 6 27 48 54 11            43 6 137,137,793 18.736 133,207,196 51 79 34 3 14 11            44 15 143,181,832 18.780 151,459,732 38 27 47 15 78 20 11 19 89 48 71 26 84 95 80   45 11 12,117,616 16.310 10,394,295 20 17 18 1 10 5 81 55 2 33 13       46 8 25,298,293 17.046 24,352,349 10 82 73 5 7 25 13 39          47 12 63,922,601 17.973 65,877,433 25 26 50 62 64 15 46 40 11 66 76 19      
Table 1. Example of construction tender dataset used for the analysis 
Order Dataset Order Bidder i's ordered LN Bm  values ► 
(from↓to↑►) (LN Bm ) (◄from↓to↑) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25-36 37-45 46-61 62-100 
1 16.086 1 16.310 16.310 17.110 16.086 16.310 16.832 16.086 16.578 16.086 16.086 17.779 16.963 16.310 16.578 17.877 16.532 16.086 16.310 16.086 16.086 16.532 16.086 17.779 17.939 … … … … 
2 16.310 2 16.532 16.532 17.238 16.832 16.832 17.110 16.578 16.963 16.832 16.310 17.822 17.192 16.532 17.238 17.973 17.192 16.310 16.532 16.532 16.310 17.779 16.578 17.806 18.225 … … …  
3 16.532 3 16.832 17.238 17.306 16.963 16.963 17.306 16.832 17.202 17.877 16.832 17.973 17.202 16.832 17.437 18.195 17.202 16.532 17.779 17.162 17.806 18.043 17.202 18.225 18.348 … …   
4 16.578 4 17.192 17.306 17.606 17.110 17.046 17.740 16.963 17.238 18.195 17.046 18.018 17.437 16.947 17.779 18.309 17.437 16.578 17.939 17.437 18.550 18.119 17.238 18.348 18.502 …    
5 16.832 5 17.306 17.606 17.613 17.202 17.306 17.806 17.046 17.437 18.225 17.779 18.195 17.858 17.046 18.330 18.348 17.613 17.192 18.043 17.973 18.780 18.330 17.437 18.502 18.550     
6 16.947 6 17.437 17.613 17.720 17.238 17.606 18.018 17.202 17.779 18.309 17.806 18.330 18.309 17.202 18.736 18.406 17.720 17.202 18.504 18.780          
7 16.963 7 17.613 17.720 17.740 17.306 17.613 18.119 17.238 17.806 18.348 18.210 18.736 18.405 17.238 18.861 18.780 17.822 17.437            
8 17.046 8 17.720 17.806 17.806 17.437 17.720 18.195 17.779 18.210 18.406 18.348 18.780 18.502 18.043                
9 17.110 9 17.740 17.858 17.822 17.613 17.740 18.210 17.806 18.225 18.460 18.502                   
10 17.162 10 17.779 17.877 17.877 17.720 17.779 18.225 18.119 18.550 18.502 18.550                   
11 17.192 11 17.806 18.017 18.017 17.740 17.806 18.309                       
12 17.202 12 17.822 18.195 18.018 17.779 17.822 18.330                       
13 17.238 13 17.858 18.210 18.119 17.806 17.858 18.348                       
14 17.306 14 17.877 18.225 18.195 17.822 18.017 18.406                       
15 17.437 15 18.017 18.309 18.330 18.210 18.225 18.460                       
16 17.606 16 18.018 18.348 18.405 18.225 18.405 18.502                       
17 17.613 17 18.119 18.405 18.406 18.405 18.550                        
18 17.720 18 18.195 18.406 18.460 18.550                         
19 17.740 19 18.210 18.460 18.504                          
20 17.779 20 18.225 18.502 18.736                          
21 17.806 21 18.309 18.550                           
22 17.822 22 18.348 18.861                           
23 17.858 23 18.406                            
24 17.877 24 18.460                            
25 17.932 25 18.502                            
26 17.939 26 18.550                            
27 17.973 27 18.861                            
28 18.017 28                             
29 18.018 29                             
30 18.043 30                             
31 18.119 31                             
32 18.195 32                             
33 18.195 33                             
34 18.210 34                             
35 18.225 35                             
36 18.309 36                             
37 18.330 37                             
38 18.348 38                             
39 18.405 39                             
40 18.406 40                             
41 18.460 41                             
42 18.502 42                             
43 18.504 43                             
44 18.550 44                             
45 18.736 45                             
46 18.780 46                             
47 18.861 51                             
Count (Cd ) 47 Count (Ci ) 27 22 20 18 17 16 10 10 10 10 8 8 8 7 7 7 7 6 6 5 5 5 5 5 4 3 2 1 
(Biased) Particip. Ratios R i=Ci /Cd 0.5745 0.4681 0.4255 0.3830 0.3617 0.3404 0.2128 0.2128 0.2128 0.2128 0.1702 0.1702 0.1702 0.1489 0.1489 0.1489 0.1489 0.1277 0.1277 0.1064 0.1064 0.1064 0.1064 0.1064 0.0851 0.0638 0.0426 0.0213 
                               
Mean (μ d ) 17.762 Mean (μ i ) 17.854 17.925 17.951 17.558 17.623 17.995 17.165 17.599 17.924 17.547 18.204 17.734 17.019 17.851 18.270 17.360 16.763 17.518 17.328 17.506 17.761 16.908 18.132 18.313 … … … … 
Std. Dev.(σ d ) 0.676 Std.Dev.(σ i ) 0.612 0.640 0.450 0.612 0.580 0.506 0.613 0.624 0.811 0.916 0.386 0.615 0.522 0.837 0.298 0.438 0.513 0.886 0.973 1.250 0.714 0.561 0.325 0.245 … … … - 
                               
A²d 0.657 A²i 0.639 0.733 0.220 0.240 0.432 0.749 0.220 0.200 1.302 0.456 0.413 0.469 0.318 0.229 0.263 0.386 0.388 0.528 0.165 0.443 0.694 0.449 0.422 0.309 … … … - 
A²crit d 0.752 A²crit i 0.752 0.752 0.752 0.752 0.752 0.752 0.752 0.752 0.752 0.752 0.752 0.752 0.752 0.752 0.752 0.752 0.752 0.752 0.752 0.752 0.752 0.752 0.752 0.752 0.752 0.752 0.752 - 
A²d <A²crit d?  A²i<A²crit i?                         x12 x9 x16 - 
Table 2. Analysis of lognormal participation distributions of all bidders with at least five bids submitted  
ID 
Database Type of 
Country Period Source 
Alias work 
1 UK51 Buildings England 1981-1982 (Skitmore & Pemberton, 1994) 
2 US50 Buildings USA 1965-1969 (Shaffer & Micheau, 1971) 
3 SP45 WWTP Spain 2007-2008 (Ballesteros-Pérez et al. , 2012) 
4 UK272 Civil and Buildings UK 1969-1979 (Skitmore, 1981) 
5 UK218 Civil England 1979-1982 (Skitmore, 1986) 
6 UK373 Buildings London 1976-1977 (Skitmore, 1986) 
7 US64 Buildings USA 1976-1984 (Brown, 1986) 
8 HK199 Buildings Hong Kong 1981-1990 (Drew, 1995) 
9 HK261A Services Hong Kong 1991-1996 (Fu, 2004) 
10 HK261B Services Hong Kong 1991-1996 (Fu, 2004) 
11 AU152 Civil Australia 1972-1982 (Runeson, 1987) 
12 AU161 Civil Australia 1972-1982 (Runeson, 1987) 
 
ID 
One shared Number of Kolmogorov-Smirnov goodness of fit test (Lognormal distr.) 
bidder auctions D Dα=0.01 Dα=0.05 Dα=0.10 D<Dα=0.01? D<Dα=0.05? D<Dα=0.10? 
1 Yes 51 0.074 0.143 0.123 0.113    
2 Yes 50 0.077 0.144 0.125 0.114    
3 Yes 45 0.060 0.152 0.131 0.120    
4 No 272 0.039 0.063 0.054 0.050    
5 No 218 0.051 0.070 0.060 0.055    
6 No 373 0.022 0.053 0.046 0.042    
7 No 64 0.081 0.128 0.111 0.101    
8 No 199 0.032 0.073 0.063 0.058    
9 No 202 0.065 0.073 0.063 0.057    
10 No 59 0.089 0.129 0.111 0.102    
11 No 152 0.070 0.084 0.072 0.066    
12 No 161 0.050 0.081 0.070 0.064    
Table 3. Lognormal distribution goodness of fit tests for twelve construction and services tender 
databases found in the project management literature 
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Figure 1. Mean bid cumulative distribution of the complete dataset and the five bidders that had 
higher participation 
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Figure 2. Unbiased Participation Ratio distributions of the five bidders that had higher participation 
Bm = 1.114·Bo
R² = 0.9343
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Figure 3. Regression straight line between the engineer’s cost estimate (Bo) and all bidders’ mean bid 
(Bm) for all the auctions contained in the example dataset 
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Figure 4. Comparison of the Actual and Model Number of bidders distributions 
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Figure 5. Evolution of once-bidders appearance as a function of the tender size order 
